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THOUGHTS ON THE SYMPOSIUM: THE MORALITY
OF LAW
By

DONALD

A.

GIANNELLAt

P ROFESSOR FULLER'S observations on the internal morality of
law follow from his definition of law as the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules. It is not too surprising that his views are vigorously rejected by those predisposed
to a positivist jurisprudence which defines law as those rules formulated
by governmental officials and enforced by the coercive sanctions of the
state. Whether we are defining law either to understand it as a social
fact, or to understand its relation to morality, Professor Fuller's views
seem the more enlightening.
No less a positivist than Professor H. L. A. Hart has warned
in his recent book, The Concept of Law, against the sterility of viewing
law solely in terms of official behavior and forgetting that its main
purpose is to provide standards for the guidance of social conduct.
Once the directive quality of law is fully appreciated, a satisfactory
definition must highlight, as Fuller's does, not only the actions of
those governing but also the responsive behavior of those governed.
Even if it were possible to imagine a system of law within which the
commands of the rulers would automatically or mechanically result
in a certain configuration of social conduct, such a system would be at
odds with the traditional western conception of law. The notion that
rules of law must be backed up by coercive sanctions indicates that
we view law as a system for directing the actions of self-determining
human beings.
One of the consequences of focusing on the directive quality of law
should be a realization that the modes of the law involve moral questions as well as its ends. When Professor Dworkin speaks of "good"
laws or "bad" laws he is measuring them solely in terms of their
particular social ends. He tends to forget that in order to implement
those ends the cooperative action of intelligent, responsible subjects
must be enlisted. How that cooperative action is enlisted can be
evaluated in moral categories. Surely no one will deny that the
nature of the sanction used to secure compliance with a law is subject
to moral judgment. Professor Fuller goes further and asks us to cont A.B., 1951, LL.B., 1954, Harvard University; Professor of Law, Villanova
University; Director, Institute of Church and State.
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sider in moral terms the manner in which the legislator issues his
commands.
It is difficult to see how one can deny that certain utilitarian
values inhere in the qualities of certainty and stability in lawmaking,
regardless of a given law's social purposes. As far as the individual
is concerned, the sense of his personal security is enhanced and an
added dimension is given to his personal liberty since he can plan his
future with greater certainty. As far as society as a whole is concerned,
especially if it is organized along free enterprise lines, it is benefitted
by the increased opportunity for socially useful activity that depends
on individual or joint planning.
I think it is a serious miscalculation to reduce the qualities of
the law, with which Professor Fuller is concerned, to canons for the
enterprise of efficacious law-making, as Professor Dworkin would do.
They loom too large as important ends in themselves, even though
they may be subsidiary to the external ends of the law. I do not think
it is too far afield to analogize these qualities as they relate to the
direction of human behavior to the quality of truthfulness as it relates
to human discourse. Telling the truth, like laws that comply admirably
with Fuller's canons, can be put to good or bad uses. This does not
mean that we are morally indifferent to whether the truth is spoken
or not. When the truth is spoken to advance the virtue of friendliness, it seems the act can be commended for possessing two moral
qualities. It is a better act than when a lie is spoken to further the
same ends. Similarly a prospective law cast in clear terms to achieve
a laudable social end is morally better than a retroactive, unclear one
seeking the same objectives.
If we stop to consider why telling the truth is considered an important end in itself, it may shed some light on the moral nature of
Fuller's canons. Truthfulness is prized for itself because of the respect
it shows for the intelligence and responsibility of the listener and for
the integrity of the process of communication. Law is, of course, a form
of communication involving the giving and following of directions, or
commands. In giving his commands therefore, the lawgiver should
respect the intelligence and responsibility of his subjects and the integrity
of this process of communication. It does not seem untoward to urge, as
Professor Fuller does, that the meaningful use of language in lawmaking
is a moral ideal, particularly when so much is usually at stake in this
form of communication.
Significantly, Professor Dworkin uses the example of a law
authorizing genocide to illustrate that Professor Fuller's canons of legal
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol10/iss4/9
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morality presumably do not make sense as such. In Dworkin's opinion
genocide is thoroughly bad and laws providing for it are not morally
improved by being made prospective, perfectly clear, or in any way
conformable to Fuller's canons. This example is hardly designed to
illustrate the strengths of the Fuller analysis. It is particularly inapposite since the private citizen affected by the genocide law is a
passive victim of governmental action. This is far removed from the
standard case in which the private citizen must take an active part in
the implementation of the law's social purposes.
A mort instructive case is the one in which the behavior of private
citizens is directed toward a socially desirable result by a law which
is seriously deficient according to one of Fuller's canons. Suppose a
law is passed providing for the fine and imprisonment of an innkeeper
who refuses to provide food or lodging to members of the colored
races. If the law is made retroactive, it can be criticized as "unfair",
"bad" or "unjust" without doing violence to the accepted meanings of
these terms.
It can be argued that the immorality of an ex post facto criminal
law has nothing to do with canons of legality. It can be urged that
such a law is bad since the retroactivity involved will not deter future
conduct and therefore causes unjustified suffering. But I doubt that
this somewhat sophisticated analysis explains why the man in the
street is immediately repelled by retroactive penal laws. He recognizes
in them the "brutal absurdity" - to borrow a phrase used by Fuller
to characterize such laws - of requiring a man to follow commands
before they have been enunciated. Such legislation violates notions
about human responsibility basic to our conception of law.
We are indebted to Professor Fuller for emphasizing and elaborating on a fundamental aspect of law that can be so easily overlooked.
The legislator engaged in social engineering is working with the raw
material of human beings and their relationships. The manner in
which he uses such raw material is of great moral importance, and
this should not be ignored because of our primary moral concern with
the ends towards which he works.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965

3

